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Manslaughter By Automobile
Johnson v. State'
Defendant was driving north on William Street, a oneway four-lane highway in Baltimore City, at about 1:50
A. M. About 150 feet past the intersection of William and
York Streets there is a sharp curve in William Street, with
a curb on the northeasterly side. Defendant's automobile
struck the curb, then sideswiped a nearby light pole, and
wound up in a grass plot more than 600 feet from the light
pole. The deceased, a passenger in defendant's car, was
thrown from the automobile, and died a week later as a
result of injuries sustained. A witness for the State testified
that she was driving north on William Street and, at the
intersection of York Street, defendant's automobile passed
her on the right, going about 60 miles per hour. However,
on cross-examination, she testified that she did not know
how fast he was going. Defendant testified that he was
going 35 miles per hour, that he lost control of his car when
he ran over railroad tracks shortly before entering the intersection of William and York Streets, and that he had no
further recollection until the automobile came to rest on
the grass plot. The trial judge, sitting without a jury, found
the defendant guilty of manslaughter because his speed was
excessive, and he was therefore unable to control his automobile. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that on the
evidence submitted, -the speed indulged in, considering the
time and place, was not so excessive as to constitute gross
negligence within the meaning of the manslaughter by
automobile statute, which reads:
"Every person causing the death of another as the
result of the driving, operation or control of an automobile, . . . in a grossly negligent manner, shall be

guilty of a misdemeanor to be known as 'manslaughter
by automobile,...'I
The Court repeated the rule, found in the previous Maryland cases arising under this statute, that:
"... to constitute gross negligence, the conduct of
the defendant must be such as to amount to a wanton or
reckless'8 disregard for human life or for the rights of
others.
1213 Md. 527, 132 A. 2d 853 (1957).
33 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, Sec. 388.
8Supra, n. 1, 531.
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The Court said that although the speed may have been
enough to establish ordinary negligence sufficient for civil
liability, it was not enough, considering that the street was
a one-way four-lane highway, that the time was the early
morning, and that there was little traffic, to constitute gross
negligence. The opinion also uses the phrase" 'criminal indifference to consequences'" as a test for gross negligence.4
The chief difficulty in cases of manslaughter by automobile is determining what conduct constitutes gross negligence and what falls short. Do the phrases "wanton or
reckless disregard for human life" or "criminal indifference
to consequences" furnish any more explicit standard by
which to judge a set of facts than the phrase "gross negligence"? If they do, just what type of conduct renders one
criminally liable with reference to these standards? If they
do not, is it possible to formulate more precise standards
in this area and would more precise standards be more
desirable?
The first Maryland case under the manslaughter by
automobile statute was Hughes v. State.5 The Court there
cited with approval a footnote in the MARYILA LAW
REviw 8 to the effect that the common law standard of
"gross negligence" as the minimum requirement for manslaughter in an unintentional homicide was carried over
into the statute setting up the separate crime of manslaughter by automobile or other vehicle. It was held that
the test for gross negligence was whether the defendant's
conduct amounted to a "'wanton or reckless disregard for
human life'."7 In that case, the Court had no difficulty in
affirming the conviction, as the defendant swerved his
truck toward a group of men on the side of the road, striking a parked vehicle on which the deceased was sitting.
There, from the facts as reported, the defendant's conduct
seemed dangerously close to intentional.
The next case decided by the Court of Appeals, Duren
v. State,8 is perhaps the most important. There the defendant struck the deceased, a pedestrian who had been drinking, at an intersection in a congested residential and business area of Baltimore City. There was a conflict among
witnesses as to the defendant's speed, one saying 60 miles
per hour and another saying 35, although long skid marks
leading up to the intersection and beyond suggested that
' Ibid, 532.
198 Md. 424, 84 A. 2d 419 (1951).
*8 Md. L. Rev. 47, 51 (1943), n. 14.
Supra, n. 5, 432.
'203 Md. 584, 102 A. 2d 277 (1954).
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the defendant was going at a fairly high rate. The defendant had the green light. The Court affirmed the conviction, saying that the environment in which speed is indulged in determines whether it constitutes gross negligence. The Court quoted the New York Court of Appeals,
saying gross negligence meant:
" ... disregard of the consequences which may ensue from the act, and indifference to the rights of others.
No clearer definition, applicable to the hundreds of
varying circumstances that may arise, can be given.
Under a given state of facts, whether negligence is
culpable is a question of judgment'." 9
However, on the facts of the Duren10 case, some may doubt
that the Maryland Court of Appeals is really doing what it
says it is, i.e., requiring something substantially more than
ordinary negligence. It is fairly clear that approaching a
city intersection at a speed between 35 and 60 constitutes
negligence to some degree. But, when the factors of the
green light and the apparently frantic attempt to stop, as
evidenced by long skid marks, are taken into consideration,
do the acts of the defendant amount to such conduct as is
connoted by words such as "gross negligence", "wanton and
reckless disregard for human life", "indifference to the
rights of others", and "a disregard of the consequences
which might ensue", all of which are used in the opinion
of the Court? It is questionable whether the conduct of
the defendant demonstrates as criminal a state of mind as
the tests for gross negligence put forth by the Court seem
to imply. In the Duren" case Judge Henderson dissented
in language similar to that used by many courts: ". . . I
think the evidence must show a degree of negligence that
is the substantial equivalent of criminal intent.' 1 2 Also,
because of the deceased's having been drinking and walking
through a red light, the dissent, while conceding that contributory negligence of the deceased is no bar to criminal
prosecution, said that it must be considered in determining
the proximate cause of the accident.
9Ibid, 590, quoting from People v. Angelo, 246 N. Y. 451, 159 N. E. 394, 396
(1927). The New York Court went on to say that ordinarily it is a jury
question, but may be a question of law if the negligence is slight. The
New York Court said that words like "gross", "wanton", and "reckless"
would convey the idea to -the jury to guide their action in spite of their
indefiniteness. This seems to be an easier approach to the problem than
attempting to define more precise standards as a matter of law.
Supra, n. 8.
Ibid.
2Ibid, dis. op. 594, 596.
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In all of the Maryland cases arising under the manslaughter by automobile statute, with the exception of the
Duren 3 case, the facts show either that an extreme degree
of negligence was present, 14 or conversely that it was questionable whether even ordinary negligence was established. 5 It is evident that Maryland is in agreement with
the majority of states in requiring a higher degree of negligence for manslaughter than will sustain a civil suit. It also
seems evident, as a result of the Duren 6 case, that Maryland does not require so culpable a state of mind as is required in some jurisdictions. Among the various states,
there appear to be basically four different views as to what
constitutes manslaughter by automobile, although in many
instances, the cases within a single jurisdiction show conflict and confusion.
The first three views are based on the presence of negligent or reckless conduct. In a few states, usually by statute,
ordinary negligence resulting in death is sufficient for
u Supra, n. 8.
"In Clay v. State, 211 Md. 577, 128 A. 2d 634 (1957), the Court of
Appeals affirmed a conviction of manslaughter where the defendant struck
the deceased at a crosswalk while speeding up to pass another vehicle, and
then left the scene of the accident without notifying anyone or reporting
the accident. The accident happened under a street light, and there was
evidence that the defendant was drinking heavily and driving at excessive
speed. The Court said that the previous Maryland cases arising under the
statute have firmly established the test for gross negligence as being conduct, considering all the factors of the case, such as amounts to a "wanton
or reckless disregard for human life", and felt the facts of this case met
the test. In Lilly v. State, 212 Md. 436, 129 A. 2d 839 (1957), a conviction
of manslaughter was affirmed where the defendant, in Baltimore City, went
through a stop sign and collided with a bus, killing the passenger in his car.
The defendant had been drinking, although he was not intoxicated, and a
witness testified he was going between 50 and 60 miles per hour. The drinking, going through a stop sign, and excessive speed, were held to furnish
-ample evidence of gross negligence. In regard to the problem of proof of
intoxication, see: Burgee, A Study of Chemical Test8 For Alcoholic Intowication. 17 Md. L. Rev. 193 (1957).
5In Thomas v. State, 206 Md. 49, 109 A. 2d 909 (1954), the Court of
Appeals reversed a conviction for manslaughter by automobile where the
defendant, approaching a bridge and seeing two boys on the bridge In the
right lane of traffic, swerved to the left in order to avoid hitting them,
whereupon the boys ran to the left side, directly in the path of the vehicle,
and were hit and killed. The trial judge based the finding of gross negligence on the ground of intoxication, as the defendant, between 10:30 A. M.
and 3:30 P. M., the time of the accident, had consumed six bottles of beer.
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence with regard to intoxication
was not sufficient to warrant a finding that the defendant was guilty of
gross negligence, as no witnesses testified that he appeared to be Intoxicated,
no tests were performed to determine whether he was under the Influence
of alcohol, and no testimony was offered as to the intoxicating effect of six
bottles of beer over such a period of time.
1oSupra, n. S.
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criminal liability. 7 Contrariwise, a few states seem to require a higher degree of negligence than is required in
Maryland." In Holder v. Fraser,9 where the Arkansas involuntary manslaughter statute punished driving with
"... reckless, willful or wanton disregard of the safety
of others",2 0 the Court said:
"Recklessness is more closely akin to intent than is
sometimes realized. It has been described as conduct
involving a risk to others that is out of all proportion
to its own utility. As the disproportion between utility
and risk increases, a point is reached at which the degree of culpability becomes indistinguishable from that
inherent in activity by which harm to others is consciously intended .... We have said that willful negligence involves consciousness of one's conduct and con' 21
tains an element equivalent to constructive intent."
However, the large majority of states, both in the language
used and in the application of the rules to fact situations,
appear to be in accord with the Maryland position of requiring something more than ordinary negligence but
not such a high degree of negligence as is connoted by
phrases such as "equivalent to intent", and "knowledge
of consequences".2 2
The fourth position, taken by a substantial number of
states, is the application of the misdemeanor-manslaughter
rule in cases of death resulting from the operation of a
vehicle. Essentially the rule is that if death results from
ISee
People v. Ross, 139 Cal. App. 706, 294 P. 2d 174 (1956) ; Solar v.
United States, 94 A. 2d 34 (D. C. App. 1953).
1See Holder v. Fraser, 215 Ark. 67, 219 S. W. 2d 625 (1949) ; People v.
Crego, 395 Ill. 451, 70 N. E. 2d 578 (1947), where the Court held that before
a verdict of guilty In an automobile manslaughter case can be sustained,
the proof must show that the defendant knew of the danger of collision and
recklessly or wantonly ran down and collided with the deceased. See also
State v. Adams, 359 Mo. 845, 224 S. W. 2d 54 (1949), a case where death
resulted from a collision at an intersection, where the Court held that the
defendant's intoxication and his failure to stop at a stop sign were not
decisive factors to convict him of involuntary manslaughter, but could be
considered with other facts in determining his guilt under the circumstances.

"IIbid.
2 ARK. STATS. (1947)

§41-2209.

2 Holder v. Fraser, supra, n. 18, 626.
See Trujillo v. People, 133 Col. 186, 292 P. 2d 980 (1956) ; Smith v.
State, 65 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1953) ; Sullivan v. State, 213 Miss. 14, 56 So. 2d
93 (1952) ; State v. Clarkson, 58 N. M. 56, 265 P. 2d 670 (1954) ; People v.
Angelo, 246 N. Y. 451, 159 N. E. 394 (1927). In State v. Homme, 226 Minn.
83, 32 N. W. 2d 151, 153 (1948), where the statute made gross negligence
resulting in death the basis for criminal liability, the Court said that,
although gross negligence means very great negligence, it does not require
"1... such reckless disregard of probable consequences as is equivalent to a
wilful and intentional wrong."
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the doing of an unlawful act, it is involuntary manslaughter.
The application of the rule is generally limited (although
the limitation is not always stated) to misdemeanors
"malum in se", misdemeanors naturally dangerous to life
or misdemeanors made such because of a desire of the legislature to avoid the particular kind of death involved in the
case under consideration. These limitations may be applied
singly or in combination. Sometimes the rule that the unlawful act must be the proximate cause of death is used
to express a similar kind of limitation. These limitations
would not seem to prevent the use of the misdemeanormanslaughter rule in most traffic violation cases, unless
the violation is a petty offense, less than a misdemeanor,
or unless the malum in se test is taken as conclusive and
23
traffic misdemeanors are held to be only mala prohibita.
Although none of the Maryland cases concerning manslaughter by automobile mention 2 4the rule, it has been
recognized in older Maryland cases.
There is an excellent discussion of the misdemeanormanslaughter rule in State v. Hup, 20 where the Supreme
Court of Delaware applied the rule in a case where death
resulted from violating the traffic law. The Court said:
"The textbooks have followed generally this division
of involuntary manslaughter into two classes, one
characterized by the commission of an unlawful act,
and the other by the doing of a lawful act in a negligent (or grossly negligent) manner." 2
In Rex v. Nickle, 34 Can. Cr. Cas. 15 (1920), where the jury found that
the defendant was not negligent in striking the deceased with his automobile, the Supreme Court of Alberta reversed an acquittal and ordered a
new trial, because the trial judge refused to instruct the jury that even
if they did not find the accused to be negligent, they should still convict
him if they found he was violating the Motor Vehicle Act by driving at an
excessive speed or driving while intoxicated. In Commonwealth v. Williams,
133 Pa. Super. 104, 1 A. 2d 812 (1938), the Court reversed a conviction for
involuntary manslaughter where the jury found that the defendant was
not negligent, although he was unlicensed (a misdemeanor) when the accident occurred. The Court held that the unlawful act had to be the proximate cause of the accident, and here the violation of the Vehicle Code had
no direct relationship to death. However, in Keller v. State, 155 Tenn. 633,
299 S. W. 803 (1927), where the defendant was driving while intoxicated
in violation of a statute and convicted, in spite of evidence that the collision could not have been avoided by the exercise of due care, the Court
affirmed the conviction, holding that if the unlawful act is malum prohibitum, the death must be the natural and probable result of the unlawful
act, but if the unlawful act is malum in 8e, as it was here held to be, the law
forbids investigation as to probable consequences.
,See Neusbaum v. Stae, 156 Md. 149, 143 A. 872 (1928), and Insurance
Co. v. Prostic, 169 Md. 535, 182 A. 421 (1936).
48 Del. 254, 101 A. 2d 355 (1953).
lbid, 356.
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The Court cited several authorities for the position that
common law involuntary manslaughter need not be based

on negligence alone, and quotes from 1 WHARTON,

HOMICIDE,

sec. 107:
"'Involuntary manslaughter, according to the old
writers, is where death results unintentionally, so far
as the defendant is concerned, from an unlawful act on
his part, not amounting to a27felony, or from a lawful
act negligently performed'."
Further:
"As we shall see, the Delaware cases have accepted
this classification, although the two concepts - disobedience to law and negligence - have sometimes
been confused."2
The Court said that where there is a violation of the law,
not amounting to a felony, negligence is not an element,
but where there is a lawful act, gross negligence is necessary for manslaughter.
The misdemeanor-manslaughter rule is the basis for
manslaughter by automobile prosecutions in many jurisdictions, either by statute or by applying the common law.29
In most of these jurisdictions, the rule is not used to the
exclusion of basing prosecutions on gross negligence, but
the law is that if death results either from doing an unlawful act or from gross negligence, the defendant is guilty
of involuntary manslaughter." Although the majority of
cases, where manslaughter by automobile is based on gross
InIbid.
-Ibid, 357.
' See State v. Wheeler, 70 Idaho 455, 220 P. 2d 687 (1950) ; Schluter v.
State, 153 Neb. 317, 44 N. W. 2d 588 (1950) ; State v. Martin, 164 Ohio St.
54, 128 N. E. 2d 7 (1955). In all three of these cases, it Is stated that the
violation of the traffic law must be the proximate cause of death.
aSee Cornett v. Commonwealth, 282 Ky. 322, 138 S. W. 2d 492 (1940),
where the Kentucky law is stated as rendering the defendant guilty of
voluntary manslaughter if death results from his driving with gross carelessness or in a wanton manner, but if the accident is the result of violating
the traffic law or of negligent and careless driving, the defendant is guilty
of involuntary manslaughter. See also State v. TJaden, 69 N. W. 2d 272
(N. D. 1955), where It is first degree manslaughter under the misdemeanormanslaughter rule. but second degree manslaughter If the killing is the
result of "culpable negligence".
In California, if death is the result of driving In a grossly negligent
manner, the maximum penalty is five years imprisonment. But if death is
the result of either the performing of an unlawful act or of ordinary negligence, the defendant is still criminally liable, with the maximum penalty
being one year imprisonment. See People v. Ross, 139 Cal. App. 2d 706,
294 P. 2d 174 (1956).
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negligence alone, make no mention of the misdemeanormanslaughter rule, a few cases have expressly refused to
apply the rule in manslaughter by automobile cases.31
Negligence itself is an indefinite concept, and when an
attempt is made to define degrees of negligence, the problem becomes more difficult. Perhaps the adoption of the
misdemeanor-manslaughter rule by Maryland, which would
make the defendant who engages in an unlawful act, which
is the proximate cause of death, guilty of involuntary manslaughter, would make the law more definite. Under this
rule, the presence or degree of negligence is unimportant.
In many cases, it would have the effect of making prosecutions for manslaughter easier, and this may be desirable
in view of the number of deaths caused by automobiles.
The use of such a rule would, of course, entail a judgment
that violation of a traffic safety law is sufficiently serious
to justify conviction of manslaughter.
Jo-w C. ELDRMIGE

Effect Of Subsequently Probated Will Upon
Bona Fide Purchaser From The Heirs
Matthews v. Fuller'
On June 20, 1944 the Orphans' Court for Charles County
passed an order declaring that Amelia Roy had died intestate. Letters of administration were granted to her
sister after she had stated that no will of decedent had
been found, although a diligent search had been made.
Amelia had died seized of certain land, which her heirs at
law sold to the defendant (a bona fide purchaser) after entry
of the Orphans' Court order declaring Amelia's intestacy.
Eight years later, a will purporting to be that of Amelia
Roy, dated 1936, was found in the files of a deceased attorney, and filed for probate. This paper, which was admitted to probate on September 2, 1952, gave the land to
a nephew, and not to the persons who took as heirs at law.

81See

State v. McLean, 234 N. C. 283, 67 S. E. 2d 75 (1951).

See also

State v. Neril, 10 N. J. Super. 224, 76 A. 2d 915, 917 (1950), where the Court
holds that although violations of the Motor Vehicle Law are elements to
take into consideration in determining whether there is willful or wanton
disregard of rights or safety of others, ". . . mere violations of regulatory

statutes are not sufficient to make a person criminally liable for death".
2209 Md. 42, 12D A. 2d 356 (1956).

